




























































































‘statistical’	model	of	the	phenomenon	of	coin	tossing	will	necessarily	be	much	more	involved.	A	coin	may	well	be	perfectly	symmetrical,	and	fair	in	the	sense	that	its	outcomes	are	equiprobable;	but	the	reason	for	the	fairness	of	the	coin	is	not	in	a	statistical	model	to	be	found	in	the	symmetries	of	the	object.	It	is	rather	to	be	found,	as	in	Keller’s	model,	in	the	complex	dynamics	of	the	entire	coin	tossing	phenomenon	under	a	suitable	idealised	parametrisation.	The	system	as	modelled	is	not	a	thing,	or	entity,	at	a	given	time,	but	a	rather	complex	dynamical	process	evolving	in	time,	as	described	under	a	set	of	relevant	parameters.			To	sum	up,	the	MAF	employs	what	I	have	called	pure	probabilistic	models.	These	are	models	of	systems	that	yield	a	stable	or	resilient	probability	distribution	over	macroscopic	variables	of	their	chance	setup	solely	out	of	some	deterministic	dynamics	acting	on	a	range	of	distribution	functions	over	initial	microscopic	variables	of	the	system:			 𝑝A B𝑠D𝑠E𝑠F → 𝐿𝑎𝑤>J?JKLAMAN?AO → 𝑝P Q𝑜D𝑜E		The	critical	feature	of	MAF	models	is	their	ability	to	generate	resiliently	the	same	probability	function,	given	the	same	parametrisation	of	the	phenomenon,	as	ideally	described.	A	different	probability	function	p’i	would	result	only	out	of	a	different	parametrisation,	with	a	distinct	set	of	initial	conditions	{s’1,	s’2,	….,	s’n},	in	turn	resulting	from	a	different	set	of	idealisations	in	the	model:			












mixed	statistical	model,	which	is	not	purely	probabilistic	nor	purely	stochastic,	but	a	mixture	of	both.		Another	field	that	illustrates	statistical	modelling	in	its	stochastic	variety	is	evolutionary	biology	–	particularly	population	genetics,	but	more	generally	in	the	study	of	variability	across	populations,	or	in	ecosystems.	As	for	the	former,	consider	the	notorious	Wright-Fisher	model	for	genetic	drift.	5	The	model	describes	the	time-evolution	of	a	population	of	N	genes,	under	considerably	strong	idealising	conditions.	For	instance,	it	assumes	that	populations	are	of	finite	and	do	not	vary	in	size	from	one	to	the	next	generation,	and	that	the	generations	do	not	overlap	–	i.e.	they	are	replaced	wholesale	every	time.	According	to	this	model	the	number	of	alleles	in	generation	g+1	is	obtained	by	drawing	with	replacement	from	the	gene	population	in	the	previous	generation	g.	Thus	if	there	are	i	alleles	of	type	A	in	generation	g,	then	then	number	of	type	A	alleles	in	generation	g+1	has	a	binomial	distribution	yielding	a	Markov	process	or	chain	with	a	transition	matrix	given	as:	𝑃A` = cd`e f Adg`f1 − Adgdj` ,	for	0 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁.	Each	expression	for	i,j		provides	a	transition	probability	for	the	number	of	alleles	in	a	later	generation.		The	model	can	be	refined	and	extended	by	suitably	weakening	the	idealisations	and	varying	the	range	of	parameters.	Kimura	introduced	the	hypothesis	of	neutrality:	some	gene	mutations	have	no	effect	whatever	on	fitness,	and	hence	such	alleles	cannot	vary	out	of	natural	selection;	so	genetic	drift	must	account	for	a	larger	share	of	gene	pool	variability	than	previously	thought.	This	invites	the	thought	that	the	idealisations	in	the	original	Wright-Fisher	model	may	be	too	strong,	particularly	non-overlapping	generations.	A	new	stochastic	model	then	developed	allowing	for	overlaps	amongst	generational	populations.	Once	again,	a	parametrisation	of	the	phenomenon,	under	some	idealised	description,	is	critical	in	order	to	establish	the	appropriate	probability	functions	and	their	domains.	Many	models	in	evolutionary	biology	are	neither	purely	probabilistic,	nor	purely	stochastic,	but	lie	somewhere	in	the	spectrum.	6																																																									5	For	an	exposition	see	e.g.	Blythe	and	McKane	(2007),	or	the	seminal	Fisher	(1930).	6	Rice	(2008).	
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	 5. Towards	a	Methodology	of	Chance	Explanation		Statistical	modelling	is	a	complex	activity	that	centres	around	providing	explanatory	models	for	observed	or	presumed	correlation	phenomena.	The	models	invoke	dynamical	laws	and	employ	particular	parametrisations,	often	describing	the	phenomena	in	a	highly	idealised	form.	Whether	the	laws	employed	are	deterministic	or	stochastic,	the	models	appear	to	have	an	explanatory	role.	This	often	reflects	the	fact	that	the	idealised	parametrisations	represent	to	some	degree	the	underlying	mechanisms,	causal	powers,	or	capacities	operating	in	the	system.	But	it	is	more	generally	and	minimally	related	to	the	models’	essential	posits	in	the	nexus	of	chance.			The	explanans	employs	an	idealised	description	of	the	propensities	–	or	probabilistic	dispositions	–	inherent	in	the	system.	As	the	idealisations	change,	so	do	the	required	parametrisations,	and	the	ensuing	description	of	the	propensities	in	the	system.		A	biased	or	precessing	coin	has	distinct	propensities	to	land	heads	or	tails	if	tossed,	and	it	must	be	modelled	so;	an	open	quantum	system	interacting	with	the	environment	displays	a	propensity	to	localise	as	a	result;	gene	populations	possess	certain	propensities	to	pass	on	types	of	alleles	to	the	next	generation;	and	so	on.	In	all	these	cases,	there	is	a	complex	relation	between	i)	the	propensities	in	the	systems	or	chance	set	ups,	as	revealed	in	the	parametrisation	employed;	ii)	the	probabilities	that	ensue	over	the	outcome	events,	often	at	a	macroscopic	level;	and	iii)	the	frequencies	that	are	presumed	or	observed	in	experimental	runs,	which	provide	the	empirical	basis	for	our	probability	claims,	and	which	are	ultimately	the	object	of	our	models’	explanation.			This	is	the	nexus	of	chance	in	action;	its	distinct	parts	(propensities,	probabilities,	frequencies)	are	all	required	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	methodology	employed	in	statistical	modelling.	The	order	of	explanation	seems	to	entail	a	distinct	hierarchy,	with	the	propensities	at	the	highest	level	of	explanation,	the	probabilities	as	the	formal	representation	of	the	dynamical	consequences	of	the	propensities,	and	the	finite	frequencies	as	the	putative	consequences	or	
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explananda.	Most	minimally,	the	explanation	is	a	variety	of	the	model	explanations	that	have	been	recently	discussed	in	the	literature	(Bokulich,	2008).	The	essential	explanatory	posits	in	these	models	are	precisely	the	components	in	the	nexus	of	chance:	propensities,	understood	as	probabilistic	dispositions,	give	rise	within	the	highly	idealised	model	descriptions	to	probability	distributions	over	the	outcomes;	together	propensities	and	probability	distributions	entail	certain	finite	frequencies	in	particular	experimental	set-ups.	This	is	to	say	that	all	of	them	together	provide	explanations	for	the	finite	frequencies	that	are	observed,	or	postulated	in	the	phenomena.	To	the	extent	that	a	phenomenon	P	is	minimally	explained	by	the	essential	posits	of	a	successful	model	representation	for	it,	it	follows	that	the	nexus	of	chance	is	involved	essentially	in	all	of	these	explanations.		Where	does	this	discussion	leave	the	philosophical	debate	regarding	the	nature	of	chance	or	objective	probability?	Is	objective	probability	reducible	to	propensity	or	frequency?	As	was	mentioned	earlier	on,	this	discussion	does	not	address	the	debate	in	any	way	decisively;	it	only	confronts	it	indirectly,	by	showing	that	all	three	play	a	distinct	and	irreducible	role	in	the	complex	practice	of	statistical	modelling.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	chance	is	a	complex	and	plural	notion,	requiring	us	to	consider	the	interaction	in	modelling	practice	of	its	distinct	and	complex	parts	–	while	refusing	to	reduce	any	of	the	parts	to	the	rest,	or	indeed	the	whole	complex	nexus	to	just	one	of	its	parts.	This	plural	attitude	to	chance	goes	a	much	longer	way	in	understanding	the	practice.	Does	it	also	provide	the	foundations	for	a	very	different	enquiry	into	the	nature	of	chance?	Some	have	certainly	thought	so	–	including	Hans	Reichenbach	in	his	doctoral	dissertation	(Reichenbach,	1915/2008).	That	would	turn	what	I	have	presented	here	as	a	project	in	methodology	into	another	inquiry	into	the	ontology	of	chance.		Whilst	there	is	no	doubt	that	some	new	avenues	open	up	for	such	an	inquiry,	the	safe	and	more	limited	conclusion	of	this	paper	is	this:	regardless	of	what	the	ontology	of	chance	is,	the	methodology	of	chance	explanations	via	statistical	models	is	undeniably	plural	and	irreducible.	No	serious	philosophical	inquiry	into	the	nature	of	chance	can	start	from	different	assumptions.			
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	6. Conclusion:	To	(Statistically)	Save	the	(Statistical)	Phenomena		 I	have	defended	the	view	that	chance	is	a	plural	tripartite	notion	involving	propensities,	formal	probability	distributions,	and	frequencies.	There	are	arguments	in	favour	of	this	conclusion	coming	from	the	irreducibility	of	chance	to	either	propensity	or	frequency.	But	most	significantly,	the	main	explanatory	argument	for	chance	pluralism	derive	from	scientific	modelling	practice.	The	nexus	of	chance,	as	I	have	called	it,	is	the	interlinked	set	of	practices	that	employ	dispositional	probabilities	–	or	propensities	–	as	the	grounds	for	the	formal	probability	distributions	over	outcome	spaces	typical	of	chancy	phenomena.	Both	jointly	have	explanatory	roles	in	practice.	Thus	statistical	models	differ	from	simpler	descriptive	‘probability’	models	in	that	they	are	deeply	stepped	into	explanatory	considerations	relative	to	the	idealisations	that	they	employ.	They	also	significantly	differ	on	account	of	their	dynamics,	and	so	they	lie	on	a	spectrum	from	‘pure	probabilistic’	models	–	those	endowed	only	with	deterministic	dynamics	–	to	what	I	have	called	‘pure	stochastic’	models	–	those	which	are	governed	only	by	stochastic	dynamics.			Together	propensities	and	probabilities	can	be	employed	to	account	for,	or	to	explain	(in	a	minimal	sense	of	model	explanation),	the	kind	of	finite	frequency	data	so	common	in	experimental	runs	on	chance	setups.		In	this	respect,	statistical	modelling	is	no	different	from	any	other	form	of	scientific	modelling	practice.	A	large	part	of	what	is	required	in	understanding	chance	is	related	to	understanding	the	practice	of	statistical	modelling.				REFERENCES		Abrams,	M.	(2012),	“Mechanistic	probability”,	Synthese,	187	(2),	pp.	343-375.		Blythe,	R.	A.	and	A.	J.	McKane	(2007),	“Stochastic	models	of	evolution	in	genetics,		ecology	and	linguistics”,	Journal	of	Statistical	Mechanics:	Theory	and	Experiment.	
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